In her essay “Pragmatic Laws”, Mitchell rejects the
normative and paradigmatic approach to laws. As she said, she is not going to
define what law is, but to discuss the “understanding” of the usage of
generalization in science. Firstly, Mitchell discusses about the traditional
view of laws, the normative approach. In normative approach, scientists need to
find or create strict laws that can be applied generally. By inputting
different initial conditions, these laws will generate specific outcomes that
meet the phenomena of natural world. If people cannot find such laws in
biology, then it means there are no laws in biology. The normative approach
ignores the degree of contingency. Mitchell argues that many laws, especially
biology laws, do not have clear distinction between university and contingency.
Next, Mitchell discusses the paradigmatic approach. In this approach, scientist
will compare the generalization in biology with the laws in physic or other
science to see if there is a match. If the generalizations in biology are like
the law in other science, then there are laws in biology. The paradigmatic
approach fail to define laws in some “unsystematize space” where no physical
laws can be referred.
Showing posts with label Philosophy of Biology. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Philosophy of Biology. Show all posts
Friday, April 13, 2012
What is a “Law”?
According
to Hung, the law of nature should be universally true and both informative
(empirical) and necessary. The initial requirements are both “universality” and
“truth” (133). To be a law, a statement at least should be true. If the
statement is wrong, such as “earth is cube shape”, then it is not a law
whatsoever. Universality means a law should be applicable “throughout time and
space” (133). For example, “The tree in my backyard is an oak” is not a law.
“Species are nature’s only objective taxonomic units”
Gould thinks that species are objective. He says populations
do “branch from their ancestors, evolving, interbreeding and “maintain common
ecological niche” (20). In addition,
there is strong evidence to show that species are “mental abstractions embedded
in culture practice or packages in nature” (20). Gould gives examples of the classification
method of organisms by people from other cultures, including New Guinea and
Tzeltal. These “folk taxonomies” (20) show striking consistency with our more
“scientific” Linnaean catalog. Thus, he argued that nature really is divided
into discrete species. Gould claimed that most of the time, species stay in
steady lineage. Evolution is rather a “rapid transition” than “slow
transformation” (26). Our nature is more likely to be “structure and legitimate
distinction”. He points out that “species are the units of nature’s morphology”
(26).
Breeding populations as “biological individuals”
In order to define species as
individuals, Sober takes the first step to argue that breeding populations are
“biological individuals”. By this he means, breeding populations, “a set of
local demes linked to each other by reproductive ties but not so linked to
demes outside the set” (156), can be defined as individuals.
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